The UK Covid-19 Inquiry releases its Module 1 Report on the United Kingdom’s Resilience and Preparedness

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry (the “Inquiry”) has now released its report in respect of Module 1 of its investigations: “The Resilience and Preparedness of the United Kingdom”. The report marks the first in a series of reports that will be released by the Inquiry. The work of the Inquiry is estimated to span into at least 2026.

The headline of the report, and one that has already been picked up by many news outlets comes at page 3:

The Inquiry has no hesitation in concluding that the processes, planning and policy of the civil contingency structures within the UK government and devolved administrations and civil services failed their citizens.

However, while this finding has reverberated across the media, the report sets out a number of recommendations to tackle the failures identified in the UK’s resilience and preparedness.

The key recommendations

The Inquiry’s 10 key recommendations are:

1.A simplified structure for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience

This recommendation focuses on the need to streamline the structures in place for whole-system civil emergencies; a theme throughout the report.

The Inquiry drew attention to the fact that there are many entities, groups, sub-groups, committees, sub-committees etc, involved in preparedness, yet many are working on the same thing at the same time. In turn, the Inquiry found that the system in place had become overly bureaucratic, labyrinthine and unduly complex.

The Inquiry’s recommendation seeks to simplify these structures, with the core being for a single Cabinet-level or equivalent ministerial committee having responsibility for whole-system civil emergency preparedness, chaired by either the leader or deputy leader of the relevant government of the UK and devolved administration.

2. Cabinet office leadership for whole-system civil emergencies in the UK

This recommendation seeks to centralise control to one cabinet office to monitor preparedness and resilience of other departments.

The overarching aim of this recommendation appears to be encouragement of departmental cooperation in government.

3. A better approach to risk assessment

This recommendation is for UK Government and devolved administrations to work together on developing a new approach to risk assessment, moving away from single worst-case scenario approach and one that assesses a wider range of scenarios.

There is also a focus on such risk assessment to better reflect the circumstances and characteristics particular to the different areas of the UK.

4. A UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy

The Inquiry recommends that the UK Government and devolved administrations should introduce a UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy.

This planning exercise should be subject to a reassessment at least every three years.

This recommendation builds on comments throughout the report that the UK Government’s pandemic strategy developed in 2011 was not tested, was outdated and the UK was ultimately prepared for the wrong pandemic (influenza rather than coronavirus).

5. Data and research for future pandemics

This recommendation seeks to encourage cooperation between the UK Government and devolved administrations in their data collection, allowing a better understanding of the virus and effectiveness of public health measures.

6. A regular UK-wide pandemic response exercise

This flows from comments that there were ultimately failures to learn from past civil emergency exercises.

7. Publication of findings and lessons from civil emergency exercises

As with recommendation 6, this addresses the criticism that there were failures to learn from past civil emergency exercises. The Inquiry’s comments focus on inaction due to lack of institutional memory, with a failure to learn lessons from past failures and contribute to more effective decision making in the future.

8. Published reports on whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience

This recommendation follows from comments that inaction was, in part, caused by a lack of openness. The Inquiry’s recommendation seeks to combat this through parliamentary scrutiny by requiring the UK Government and devolved administrations to produce public reports on their whole-system emergency preparedness and resilience.

9. Regular use of red teams

There are comments made throughout the report that there was an issue of ‘groupthink’ within government, decision making bodies and advisors.

The report recommends challenging this through so called “Red Teams”, these being those external to delivery and decision-making structures; the hope being these “Red Teams” are less susceptible to groupthink and can provide fresh perspective to decision makers.

10. A UK-wide independent statutory body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience

This significant recommendation requires the creation of a statutory body able to objectively assess the state of preparedness and resilience for future pandemics. The body would also be responsible for consulting a range of individuals, from local public health experts to the social enterprise sector.

Recommendation 10 flows from recommendation 9, with a view to challenging groupthink and provide decision makers with a fresh perspective.

Monitoring compliance

The Inquiry’s recommendations are far reaching and focus upon a UK-wide approach, with the aim of encouraging the UK Government and devolved administrations to work collaboratively in their preparedness for a future pandemic.

The Inquiry is empowered to make these recommendations under section 24 of the Inquiries Act 2005. Nonetheless, the Inquiry’s recommendations are not legally binding. Likewise, the Inquiry cannot make findings of civil or criminal liability in respect of the actions of any person. Accordingly, a criticism that often befalls public inquiries and their recommendations is a lack of power to ensure the government of the day acts on and implements recommendations.

However, in respect of this Inquiry, there are a number of different modules of investigation, each of which will have a separate report that is likely to include recommendations. As these recommendations will be provided on an ongoing basis, there is likely to be increased scope for continued monitoring. Indeed, the recommendations contained in the Module 1 report are accompanied by a number of deadlines of three, six and 12 months by which action to implement the relevant recommendation must be taken. This approach may be indicative of the Inquiry seeking to strengthen the effectiveness of its recommendations through more focused monitoring. The Inquiry’s Chair, Baroness Hallett, has already stated she will be closely monitoring steps taken to implement the recommendations.

Overall, the Module 1 report marks the beginning of a long journey of findings and recommendations that will be provided by the Inquiry. All interested parties will pay close attention to how the Inquiry’s recommendations are implemented as well as its continuing work and any future recommendation arising therefrom.